Department of Economics
855 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal, Quebec, H3A 2T7
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|September 2005||Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What Are the Payoffs?|
with Jennifer Hunt: w11635
We provide a theoretical framework for understanding when an official angles for a bribe, when a client pays, and the payoffs to the client's decision. We test this framework using a new data set on bribery of Peruvian public officials by households. The theory predicts that bribery is more attractive to both parties when the client is richer, and we find empirically that both bribery incidence and value are increasing in household income. However, 65% of the relation between bribery incidence and income is explained by greater use of officials by high-income households, and by their use of more corrupt types of official. Compared to a client dealing with an honest official, a client who pays a bribe has a similar probability of concluding her business, while a client who refuses to bribe ...