Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Encina Hall E407
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|June 2015||Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like CEOs? School Administrator Incentives for Anemia Reduction in Rural China|
with Renfu Luo, Grant Miller, Sean Sylvia, Marcos Vera-Hernández: w21302
Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China, we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia—as well as complementarity between incentives and orthogonally assigned discretionary resources. Large (but not small) incentives and unrestricted grants both reduced anemia, but incentives were more cost-effective. Although unrestricted grants and small incentives do not interact, grants fully crowd-out the effect of larger incentives. Our findings suggest that performance incentives can be effective in bureaucratic environments, but they are not complementary to discretionary resources.
|June 2012||The Returns to Education in China: Evidence from the 1986 Compulsory Education Law|
with Hai Fang, Karen N. Eggleston, John A. Rizzo, Richard J. Zeckhauser: w18189
As China transforms from a socialist planned economy to a market-oriented economy, its returns to education are expected to rise to meet those found in middle-income established market economies. This study employs a plausible instrument for education: the China Compulsory Education Law of 1986. We use differences among provinces in the dates of effective implementation of the compulsory education law to show that the law raised overall educational attainment in China by about 0.8 years of schooling. We then use this instrumental variable to control for the endogeneity of education and estimate the returns to an additional year of schooling in 1997-2006. Results imply that the overall returns to education are approximately 20 percent per year on average in contemporary China, fairly consis...
|March 2010||Agricultural Trade Reform and Rural Prosperity: Lessons from China|
with Jikun Huang, Yu Liu, Will Martin
in China's Growing Role in World Trade, Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei, editors
|April 2008||Agricultural Trade Reform and Rural Prosperity: Lessons from China|
with Jikun Huang, Yu Liu, Will Martin: w13958
Tariffs on agricultural products fell sharply in China both prior to, and as a consequence of, China's accession to the WTO. The paper examines the nature of agricultural trade reform in China since 1981, and finds that protection was quite strongly negative for most commodities, and particularly for exported goods, at the beginning of the reforms. Since then, the taxation of agriculture has declined sharply, with the abolition of production quotas and procurement pricing, and reductions in trade distortions for both imported and exported goods. Rural well-being has improved partly because of these reforms, and also because of strengthening of markets, public investment in infrastructure, research and development, health and education, and reductions in barriers to mobility of labor out of...