NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
Economic Research and Statistics Division
WTO, Centre William Rappard, Rue de Lausanne 154
CH-1211 Geneva 21, Switzerland
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|August 2010||Protection Reduction and Diversion: PTAs and the Incidence of Antidumping Disputes|
with Thomas J. Prusa: w16276
We analyze whether preferential trade agreements (PTAs) affect the incidence and pattern of antidumping (AD) filings. We estimate AD provisions in PTAs have decreased the incidence of intra-PTA AD cases by 33-55% and have increased the number of AD actions against non-PTA members by 10-30%. The net effect of PTA rules on total AD filings is small. Our results are robust to alternative estimation approaches and controlling for a myriad of other PTA-related phenomena. Our results suggest a protection analogue to the "trade creation-trade diversion" impact of PTAs. PTA members are spared from AD actions but non-PTA members face even greater AD scrutiny.