Department of Economics
New York University
19 West Fourth Street
New York, NY 10014
NBER Program Affiliations:
NBER Affiliation: Research Associate
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|September 2015||Monetary Exchange in Over-the-Counter Markets: A Theory of Speculative Bubbles, the Fed Model, and Self-fulfilling Liquidity Crises|
with Shengxing Zhang: w21528
We develop a model of monetary exchange in over-the-counter markets to study the effects of monetary policy on asset prices and standard measures of financial liquidity, such as bid-ask spreads, trade volume, and the incentives of dealers to supply immediacy, both by participating in the market-making activity and by holding asset inventories on their own account. The theory predicts that asset prices carry a speculative premium that reflects the asset's marketability and depends on monetary policy as well as the microstructure of the market where it is traded. These liquidity considerations imply a positive correlation between the real yield on stocks and the nominal yield on Treasury bonds---an empirical observation long regarded anomalous. The theory also exhibits rational expectations ...
|August 2014||Trade Dynamics in the Market for Federal Funds|
with Gara Afonso: w20419
We develop a model of the market for federal funds that explicitly accounts for its two distinctive features: banks have to search for a suitable counterparty, and once they meet, both parties negotiate the size of the loan and the repayment. The theory is used to answer a number of positive and normative questions: What are the determinants of the fed funds rate? How does the market reallocate funds? Is the market able to achieve an efficient reallocation of funds? We also use the model for theoretical and quantitative analyses of policy issues facing modern central banks.
Published: Gara Afonso & Ricardo Lagos, 2015. "Trade Dynamics in the Market for Federal Funds," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 263-313, 01. citation courtesy of
|October 2009||Crises and Liquidity in Over-the-Counter Markets|
with Guillaume Rocheteau, Pierre-Olivier Weill: w15414
We study the efficiency of dealers' liquidity provision and the desirability of policy intervention in over-the-counter (OTC) markets during crises. Our theory emphasizes two key frictions in OTC markets: finding counterparties takes time, and trade is bilateral, with quantities and prices determined by bargaining. We model a crisis as a negative shock to investors' asset demands that lasts until a random recovery time. In this context, dealers can provide liquidity to outside investors by acting as counterparties in trades and by accumulating asset inventories. We find that, when frictions are severe, even well capitalized dealers may not find it optimal to accumulate inventories, given that investors choose asset positions that require small reallocations. In such circumstances, the mark...
Published: Lagos, Ricardo & Rocheteau, Guillaume & Weill, Pierre-Olivier, 2011. "Crises and liquidity in over-the-counter markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2169-2205. citation courtesy of
|June 2008||Crashes and Recoveries in Illiquid Markets|
with Guillaume Rocheteau, Pierre-Olivier Weill: w14119
We study the dynamics of liquidity provision by dealers during an asset market crash, described as a temporary negative shock to investors aggregate asset demand. We consider a class of dynamic market settings where dealers can trade continuously with each other, while trading between dealers and investors is subject to delays and involves bargaining. We derive conditions on fundamentals, such as preferences, market structure and the characteristics of the market crash (e.g., severity, persistence) under which dealers provide liquidity to investors following the crash. We also characterize the conditions under which dealers incentives to provide liquidity are consistent with market efficiency.