Johns Hopkins Carey Business School
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|July 2007||The Organizational Implications of Creativity: The US Film Industry in Mid-XXth Century|
with Pablo T. Spiller: w13253
We develop a basic framework to understand the organization of highly creative activities. Management faces a fundamental tradeoff in organizing such activities. On the one hand, since creativity cannot be achieved by command and control or by monetary incentives, internal/contractual production of creative products is plagued by hazards arising from their fundamental characteristics: extremely high input, output and market uncertainty, and the inherent informational advantages of creative talent. Procuring highly creative products in the market place, though, exposes the distributor to a fundamental risk: independently produced creative goods are generic distribution-wise. Thus, in procuring creative products in the marketplace, distributors face the unavoidable winner's curse risk. ...
Published: “The Organizational Implications of Creativity: The US Film Industry in Mid-XXth Century,” with Ricard Gil, 50/1 California Management Review, 2007: 243-260.
|October 2003||Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?|
with Casey B. Mulligan, Xavier Sala-i-Martin: w10040
Estimates of democracy's effect on the public sector are obtained from comparisons of 142 countries over the years 1960-90. Based on three tenets of voting theory -- that voting mutes policy preference intensity, political power is equally distributed in democracies, and the form of voting processes is important -- we expect democracy to affect policies that redistribute, or economically favor the political leadership, or enhance efficiency. We do not find such differences. Instead democracies are less likely to use policies that limit competition for public office. Alternative modeling approaches emphasize the degree of competition, and deemphasize the form or even existence of voting processes.
Published: Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2004. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 51-74, Winter. citation courtesy of
|May 2002||Social Security and Democracy|
with Casey B. Mulligan, Xavier Sala-i-Martin: w8958
Many political economic theories use and emphasize the process of voting in their explanation of the growth of Social Security, government spending, and other public policies. But is there an empirical connection between democracy and Social Security program size or design? Using some new international data sets to produce both country-panel econometric estimates as well as case studies of South American and southern European countries, we find that Social Security policy varies according to economic and demographic factors, but that very different political histories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find little partial effect of democracy on the size of Social Security budgets, on how those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factors affect Social Se...
Published: Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier X. Sala-i-Martin, 2010.
"Social Security and Democracy,"
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy,
Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 10(1).
citation courtesy of