NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Rebecca Dizon-Ross

Booth School of Business
University of Chicago
5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
Tel: 773/702-3265

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NBER Program Affiliations: DEV , ED
NBER Affiliation: Faculty Research Fellow

NBER Working Papers and Publications

May 2018Parents' Beliefs About Their Children's Academic Ability: Implications for Educational Investments
w24610
Information about children’s school performance appears to be readily available. Do frictions prevent parents, particularly low-income parents, from acting on this information when making decisions? I conduct a field experiment in Malawi to test this. I find that parents’ baseline beliefs about their children’s academic performance are inaccurate. Providing parents with clear and digestible academic performance information causes them to update their beliefs and correspondingly adjust their investments: they increase the school enrollment of their higher-performing children, decrease the enrollment of their lower-performing children, and choose educational inputs that are more closely matched to their children’s academic level. These effects demonstrate the presence of important frictions ...
July 2015Governance and the Effectiveness of Public Health Subsidies
with Pascaline Dupas, Jonathan Robinson: w21324
Heavily subsidizing essential health products through existing health infrastructure has the potential to substantially decrease child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa. There is, however, widespread concern that poor governance and in particular limited accountability among health workers seriously undermines the effectiveness of such programs. We performed innovative audits on bed net distribution programs in three countries (Ghana, Kenya and Uganda) to investigate local agency problems and their determinants in the allocation of targeted subsidies. Overall, agency concerns appear modest. Around 80% of the eligible receive the subsidy as intended and leakage to the ineligible appears limited, even when the ineligible have a high willingness to pay. The estimated level of mistargeting only ...
 
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