NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Pushan Dutt

INSEAD
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NBER Working Papers and Publications

February 2009Comment on "Big Business Stability and Economic Growth: Is What's Good for General Motors Good for America? (Joint with Kathy Fogel and Bernard Yeung)" 2
in Financial Sector Development in the Pacific Rim, East Asia Seminar on Economics, Volume 18, Takatoshi Ito and Andrew K. Rose, editors
November 2003Labor Versus Capital in Trade-Policy Determination: The Role of General-Interest and Special-Interest Politics
with Devashish Mitra: w10084
Trade policy depends on the extent to which the government wants to redistribute income as well as on a country's overall factor endowments and their distribution. While the government's desire to redistribute income itself is dependent on asset distribution, it is to a large extent also driven by the partisan nature of the government, i.e., whether it is pro-labor or pro-capital. Using cross-country data on factor endowments, inequality and government orientation, we find that, conditional on inequality, left-wing (pro-labor) governments will adopt more protectionist trade policies in capital-rich countries, but adopt more pro-trade policies in labor-rich economies than right-wing (pro-capital) ones. Also higher inequality is associated with higher protection in capital-abundant countries...

Published: Dutt, Pushan and Devashish Mitra. "Labor Versus Capital Trade-Policy: The Role Of Ideology And Inequality," Journal of International Economics, 2006, v69(2,Jul), 310-320.

September 2002Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation
with Devashish Mitra: w9239
In this paper, we empirically investigate how government ideology affects trade policy. The prediction of a partisan, ideology-based model (within a two-sector, two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin framework) is that left-wing governments will adopt more protectionist trade policies in capital rich countries, but adopt more pro-trade policies in labor rich economies than right-wing ones. The data strongly support this prediction in a very robust fashion. There is some evidence, that this relationship may hold better in democracies than in dictatorships though the magnitude of the partisan effect seems stronger in dictatorships.

Published:

  • Dutt, Pushan and Devashish Mitra. "Endogenous Trade Policy Through Majority Voting: An Empirical Investigation," Journal of International Economics, October 2002, 58(1): 107-133
  • Dutt, Pushan and Devashish Mitra. "Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation." The Review of Economics and Statistics, February 2005, 87(1): 59-72. citation courtesy of

 
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