Paul Niehaus

Department of Economics
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive #0508
La Jolla, CA 92093
Tel: 858/534-3190
Fax: 858/534-7040

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
NBER Program Affiliations: DEV
NBER Affiliation: Research Associate

NBER Working Papers and Publications

October 2017Experimentation at Scale
with Karthik Muralidharan: w23957
This paper makes the case for greater use of randomized experiments “at scale.” We review various critiques of experimental program evaluation in developing countries, and discuss how experimenting at scale along three specific dimensions – the size of the sampling frame, the number of units treated, and the size of the unit of randomization – can help alleviate them. We find that program evaluation randomized controlled trials published in top journals over the last 15 years have typically been “small” in these senses, but also identify a number of examples – including from our own work – demonstrating that experimentation at much larger scales is both feasible and valuable.

Published: Karthik Muralidharan & Paul Niehaus, 2017. "Experimentation at Scale," Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol 31(4), pages 103-124.

September 2017General Equilibrium Effects of (Improving) Public Employment Programs: Experimental Evidence from India
with Karthik Muralidharan, Sandip Sukhtankar: w23838
Public employment programs play a large role in many developing countries' anti-poverty strategies, but their net impact on the incomes of the poor will depend on both direct program earnings as well as indirect effects through changes induced in market wages and employment. We estimate this composite effect, exploiting a large-scale randomized experiment across 157 sub-districts and 19 million people that substantially improved the implementation of India's rural employment guarantee scheme. Despite no changes in government expenditure on the program itself, the earnings of low-income households rose 13%, driven overwhelmingly by market (90%) as opposed to program earnings (10%). Low-skilled wages increased 6% and days without paid work fell 7%, while migration and prices were unaffected....
March 2014Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India
with Karthik Muralidharan, Sandip Sukhtankar: w19999
Anti-poverty programs in developing countries are often difficult to implement; in particular, many governments lack the capacity to deliver payments securely to targeted beneficiaries. We evaluate the impact of biometrically-authenticated payments infrastructure ("Smartcards") on beneficiaries of employment (NREGS) and pension (SSP) programs in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, using a large-scale experiment that randomized the rollout of Smartcards over 158 sub- districts and 19 million people. We find that, while incompletely implemented, the new system delivered a faster, more predictable, and less corrupt NREGS payments process without adversely affecting program access. For each of these outcomes, treatment group distributions first-order stochastically dominated those of the contr...

Published: Karthik Muralidharan & Paul Niehaus & Sandip Sukhtankar, 2016. "Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India," American Economic Review, vol 106(10), pages 2895-2929. citation courtesy of

May 2011Managing Self-Confidence: Theory and Experimental Evidence
with Markus M. Mobius, Muriel Niederle, Tanya S. Rosenblat: w17014
Evidence from social psychology suggests that agents process information about their own ability in a biased manner. This evidence has motivated exciting research in behavioral economics, but has also garnered critics who point out that it is potentially consistent with standard Bayesian updating. We implement a direct experimental test. We study a large sample of 656 undergraduate students, tracking the evolution of their beliefs about their own relative performance on an IQ test as they receive noisy feedback from a known data-generating process. Our design lets us repeatedly measure the complete relevant belief distribution incentive-compatibly. We find that subjects (1) place approximately full weight on their priors, but (2) are asymmetric, over-weighting positive feedback relative to...
NBER Videos

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email:

Contact Us