Patrick Van Horn
Department of Economics and Business
1030 Columbia Avenue
Claremont, CA 91711
Tel: (512) 863-1993
Institutional Affiliation: Scripps College
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|January 2020||Countercyclical Capital Buffers: A Cautionary Tale|
with Christoffer Koch, Gary Richardson: w26710
Countercyclical capital buffers (CCyBs) are an old idea recently resurrected. CCyBs compel banks at the core of financial systems to accumulate capital during expansions so that they are better able to sustain operations during downturns. To gauge the potential impact of modern CCyBs, we compare the behavior of large and highly-connected commercial banks during booms before the Great Depression and Great Recession. Before the former, core banks did not expect bailouts and were subject to regulations that incentivized capital accumulation during booms. Before the later, core banks expected bailouts and kept capital levels close to regulatory minima. Our analysis indicates that the pre-Depression regulatory regime induced money-center banks to build capital buffers between 3% and 5% of total...
|September 2011||In the Eye of a Storm: Manhattan's Money Center Banks During the International Financial Crisis of 1931|
with Gary Richardson: w17437
In the summer of 1931, a financial crisis began in Austria, spread to Germany, forced Britain to abandon the gold standard, crossed the Atlantic, and afflicted financial institutions in the United States. This article describes how banks in New York City, the central money market of the United States, reacted to this trans-Atlantic trauma. New York’s money-center banks anticipated the onset of a financial crisis, prepared for it by accumulating substantial reserves, and during the European crisis, continued business as usual. New York’s leading bankers deliberately and collectively decided on the business-as-usual policy in order to minimize the impact of the panic in the United States. New York banks’ behavior changed only after the Federal Reserve raised discount rates to stem gold outfl...
Published: Gary Richardson & Patrick Van Horn, 2017. "In the Eye of a Storm: Manhattan's Money Center Banks during the International Financial Crisis of 1931," Explorations in Economic History, . citation courtesy of
|June 2008||Intensified Regulatory Scrutiny and Bank Distress in New York City During the Great Depression|
with Gary Richardson: w14120
New data reveals that bank distress peaked in New York City, at the center of the United States money market, in July and August 1931, when the banking crisis peaked in Germany and before Britain abandoned the gold standard. This paper tests competing theories about the causes of New York's banking crisis. The cause appears to have been intensified regulatory scrutiny, which was a delayed reaction to the failure of the Bank of United States, rather than the exposure of money-center banks to events overseas.
Published: Richardson, Gary & Van Horn, Patrick, 2009.
"Intensified Regulatory Scrutiny and Bank Distress in New York City During the Great Depression,"
The Journal of Economic History,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(02), pages 446-465, June.
citation courtesy of
|March 2007||Fetters of Debt, Deposit, or Gold during the Great Depression? The International Propagation of the Banking Crisis of 1931|
with Gary Richardson: w12983
A banking crisis began in Austria in May 1931 and intensified in July, when runs struck banks throughout Germany. In September, the crisis compelled Britain to quit the gold standard. Newly discovered data shows that failure rates rose for banks in New York City, at the center of the United States money market, in July and August 1931, before Britain abandoned the gold standard and before financial outflows compelled the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates. Banks in New York City had large exposures to foreign deposits and German debt. This paper tests to see whether the foreign exposure of money center banks linked the financial crises on the two sides of the Atlantic.
Published: Richardson Gary & Van Horn Patrick, 2011. "Fetters of Debt, Deposit, or Gold during the Great Depression? The International Propagation of the Banking Crisis of 1931," Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook, De Gruyter, vol. 52(2), pages 29-54, December. citation courtesy of