NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Nicolas R. Ziebarth

Cornell University
Department of Policy Analysis and Management (PAM)
426 Kennedy Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853

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NBER Working Papers and Publications

June 2017Exit, Voice or Loyalty? An Investigation into Mandated Portability of Front-Loaded Private Health Plans
with Juan Pablo Atal, Hanming Fang, Martin Karlsson: w23468
We study theoretically and empirically how consumers in an individual private long-term health insurance market with front-loaded contracts respond to newly mandated portability requirements of their old-age provisions. To foster competition, effective 2009, German legislature made the portability of standardized old-age provisions mandatory. Our theoretical model predicts that the portability reform will increase internal plan switching. However, under plausible assumptions, it will not increase external insurer switching. Moreover, the portability reform will enable unhealthier enrollees to reoptimize their plans. We find confirmatory evidence for the theoretical predictions using claims panel data from a big private insurer.
August 2016The Pros and Cons of Sick Pay Schemes: Testing for Contagious Presenteeism and Noncontagious Absenteeism Behavior
with Stefan Pichler: w22530
This paper provides an analytical framework and uses data from the US and Germany to test for the existence of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. The first part exploits high-frequency Google Flu data and the staggered implementation of U.S. sick leave reforms to show in a reduced-from framework that population-level influenza-like disease rates decrease after employees gain access to paid sick leave. Next, a simple theoretical framework provides evidence on the underlying behavioral mechanisms. The model theoretically decomposes overall behavioral labor supply adjustments ('moral hazard') into contagious presenteeism and noncontagious absenteeism behavior and derives testable conditions. The last part illustrates how to implement the model ex...

Published: Stefan Pichler & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2017. "The Pros and Cons of Sick Pay Schemes: Testing for Contagious Presenteeism and Noncontagious Absenteeism Behavior," Journal of Public Economics, . citation courtesy of

July 2016The Pros and Cons of Sick Pay Schemes: Testing for Contagious Presenteeism and Shirking Behavior
with Stefan Pichler
in Social Insurance Programs (Trans-Atlantic Public Economic Seminar - TAPES), Roger Gordon, Andreas Peichl and James Poterba, organizers
 
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