NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
loading...

Manoj Mohanan

Sanford School of Public Policy
201 Science Drive RH128
Durham, NC 27708

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: Duke University, Sanford School of Public Policy

NBER Working Papers and Publications

November 2019Does The Market Reward Quality?: Evidence from India
with Zachary Wagner, Somalee Banerjee, Neeraj Sood: w26460
There are two salient facts about health care in low and middle-income countries; 1) the private sector plays an important role and 2) the care provided is often of poor quality. Despite these facts we know little about what drives quality of care in the private sector and why patients continue to seek care from poor quality providers. We use two field studies in India that provide unique insight into this issue. First, we use a discrete choice experiment to show that patients are willing to pay higher prices for better technical quality (defined by correct treatment and correct diagnosis). Second, we use standardized patients to show that private providers who provide better technical quality are not able to charge higher prices. Instead providers are able to charge higher prices for elem...
January 2019Different Strokes for Different Folks: Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Input and Output Incentive Contracts for Health Care Providers with Varying Skills
with Katherine Donato, Grant Miller, Yulya Truskinovsky, Marcos Vera-Hernández: w25499
A central issue in designing performance incentive contracts is whether to reward the production of outputs versus use of inputs: the former rewards efficiency and innovation in production, while the latter imposes less risk on agents. Agents with varying levels of skill may perform better under different contracts as well – more skilled workers may be better able to innovate, for example. We study these issues empirically through an experiment enabling us to observe and verify outputs (health outcomes) and inputs (adherence to recommended medical treatment) in Indian maternity care. We find that both output and input incentive contracts achieved comparable reductions in post-partum hemorrhage rates, the dimension of maternity care most sensitive to provider behavior and the largest cause ...
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us