Michael A. Kuhn
Department of Economics
1285 University of Oregon
Eugene, CA 97403
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|January 2016||Starting Small: Endogenous Stakes and Rational Cooperation|
with James Andreoni, Larry Samuelson: w21934
We report experimental results for a twice-played prisoners’ dilemma in which the players can choose the allocation of the stakes across the two periods. Our point of departure is the assumption that some (but not all) people are principled to “do the right thing,” or cooperate, as long as their opponent is sufficiently likely to do so. The presence of such types can be exploited to enhance cooperation by structuring the twice-played prisoners’ dilemma to “start small,” so that the second-stage stakes are larger (but not too much larger) than the first-stage stakes. We compare conditions where the allocation of stakes is chosen exogenously to conditions where it is chosen by the players themselves. We show that players are able to find and choose the payoff maximizing strategy of starting ...
|August 2013||On Measuring Time Preferences|
with James Andreoni, Charles Sprenger: w19392
Eliciting time preferences has become an important component of both laboratory and field experiments, yet there is no consensus as how to best measure discounting. We examine the predictive validity of two recent, simple, easily administered, and individually successful elicitation tools: Convex Time Budgets (CTB) and Double Multiple Price Lists (DMPL). Using similar methods, the CTB and DMPL are compared using within- and out-of-sample predictions. While each perform equally well within sample, the CTB significantly outperforms the DMPL on out-of-sample measures.
Published: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Volume 116, August 2015, Pages 451–464 Cover image Measuring time preferences: A comparison of experimental methods ☆ James Andreonia, , Michael A. Kuhnb, , Charles Sprengerc, ,