Universidad de San Andres
Vito Dumas 284
Buenos Aires (B1644BID)
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|June 2012||Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service|
with Ernesto Dal Bó, Frederico Finan: w18156
We study a recent recruitment drive for public sector positions in Mexico. Different salaries were announced randomly across recruitment sites, and job offers were subsequently randomized. Screening relied on exams designed to measure applicants' intellectual ability, personality, and motivation. This allows the first experimental estimates of (i) the role of financial incentives in attracting a larger and more qualified pool of applicants, (ii) the elasticity of the labor supply facing the employer, and (iii) the role of job attributes (distance, attractiveness of the municipal environment) in helping fill vacancies, as well as the role of wages in helping fill positions in less attractive municipalities. A theoretical model guides each stage of the empirical inquiry. We find that higher ...
Published: Ernesto Dal BÃ³ & Frederico Finan & MartÃn A. Rossi, 2013. "Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 128(3), pages 1169-1218. citation courtesy of
|November 2008||Term Length and Political Performance|
with Ernesto Dal Bó: w14511
We evaluate the effects of the duration of legislative terms on the performance of legislators. We exploit a natural experiment in the Argentine House of Representatives where term lengths were assigned randomly. Results for various objective measures of legislative output show that longer terms enhance legislative performance. We use a second experiment in the Argentine Senate to determine whether our results are specific to a particular chamber and a particular time. The results from the Senate reinforce the idea that longer terms enhance legislative productivity. Our results highlight limits to classic theories of electoral discipline (Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986) predicting that shorter terms, by tightening accountability, will incentivize hard work by politicians. We discuss and test po...
Published: Term Length and The Effort of Politicians, Review of Economic Studies 78(4), October 2011, (with Martín Rossi)