University of Notre Dame
264 Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|May 2012||Should Benchmark Indices Have Alpha? Revisiting Performance Evaluation|
with Antti Petajisto, Eric Zitzewitz: w18050
Standard Fama-French and Carhart models produce economically and statistically significant nonzero alphas, even for passive benchmark indices such as the S&P 500 and Russell 2000. We find that these alphas arise primarily from the disproportionate weight the Fama-French factors place on small value stocks, which have performed well, and from the CRSP value-weighted market index, which is historically a downward-biased benchmark for U.S. stocks. We propose small methodological changes to the Fama-French factors to eliminate the nonzero alphas, and we also propose factor models based on common and tradable benchmark indices. Both kinds of alternative models improve performance evaluation of actively managed portfolios, with the index-based models exhibiting the best performance.
Published: Cremers, Martijn & Petajisto, Antti & Zitzewitz, Eric, 2013. "Should Benchmark Indices Have Alpha? Revisiting Performance Evaluation," Critical Finance Review, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 1-48, July. citation courtesy of
|October 2009||Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting on Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Regulation|
with Roberta Romano: w15449
This paper examines the impact on shareholder voting of the mutual fund voting disclosure regulation adopted by the SEC in 2003, using a paired sample of management proposals on executive equity incentive compensation plans submitted before and after the rule change. While voting support for management has decreased over time, we find no evidence that mutual funds' support for management declined after the rule change, as expected by advocates of disclosure. In fact, we find evidence of increased support for management by mutual funds after the change. There is some evidence that firms sponsoring such proposals both before and after the rule change differ from those sponsoring a proposal only before the change. For example, firms are more likely to sponsor a proposal both before and after ...
Published: I nstitutional I nv e stors a n d Pro x y Voti n g on Compens a tion Plans: The I m p a c t of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Regulation ( with Martijn Cremers), 13 American Law and Economics Review 220 ( 2011)
|September 2009||Tiebreaker: Certification and Multiple Credit Ratings|
with Dion Bongaerts, William N. Goetzmann: w15331
This paper explores the economic role credit rating agencies play in the corporate bond market. We consider three existing theories about multiple ratings: information production, rating shopping and regulatory certification. Using differences in rating composition, default prediction and credit spread changes, our evidence only supports regulatory certification. Marginal, additional credit ratings are more likely to occur because of, and seem to matter primarily for regulatory purposes, but do not seem to provide significant additional information related to credit quality.
Published: Dion Bongaerts & K. J. Martijn Cremers & William N. Goetzmann, 2012. "Tiebreaker: Certification and Multiple Credit Ratings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 113-152, 02. citation courtesy of
|December 2007||CEO Centrality|
with Lucian A. Bebchuk, Urs Peyer: w13701
We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured by the CEO. We find that CEO centrality is negatively associated with firm value (as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's Q). Greater CEO centrality is also correlated with (i) lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, (ii) lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, (iii) higher odds of the CEO's receiving a "lucky" option grant at the lowest price of the month, (iv) greater tendenc...
Published: Journal of Financial Economics Volume 102, Issue 1, October 2011, Pages 199–221 Cover image The CEO pay slice ☆ Lucian A. Bebchuka, b, K.J. Martijn Cremersc, Urs C. Peyerd,