Mar Reguant

Department of Economics
Northwestern University
302 Donald P. Jacobs
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
NBER Program Affiliations: IO , EEE
NBER Affiliation: Faculty Research Fellow

NBER Working Papers and Publications

December 2014Sequential Markets, Market Power and Arbitrage
with Koichiro Ito: w20782
We develop a theoretical framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and limited arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using micro-data from the Iberian electricity market. We show that the observed price differences and firm behavior are consistent with the model. Finally, we quantify the welfare effects of arbitrage using a structural model. In our setting, we show that full arbitrage is not necessarily welfare-enhancing in the presence of market power, reducing consumer costs but decreasing productive efficiency.


November 2013Pass-through of Emissions Costs in Electricity Markets
with Natalia Fabra: w19613
We measure the pass-through of emissions costs to electricity prices and explore its determinants. We perform both reduced-form and structural estimations based on optimal bidding in this market. Using rich micro-level data, we estimate the channels affecting pass-through in a flexible manner, with minimal functional form assumptions. Contrary to many studies in the general pass-through literature, we find that emissions costs are almost fully passed-through to electricity prices. Since electricity is traded through high-frequency auctions for highly inelastic demand, firms have weak incentives to adjust markups after the cost shock. Furthermore, the costs of price adjustment are small.

Published: Natalia Fabra & Mar Reguant, 2014. "Pass-Through of Emissions Costs in Electricity Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(9), pages 2872-99, September. citation courtesy of

December 2012Market-Based Emissions Regulation and Industry Dynamics
with Meredith Fowlie, Stephen P. Ryan: w18645
We assess the long-run dynamic implications of market-based regulation of carbon dioxide emissions in the US Portland cement industry. We consider several alternative policy designs, including mechanisms that use production subsidies to partially offset compliance costs and border tax adjustments to penalize emissions associated with foreign imports. Our results highlight two general countervailing market distortions. First, following Buchanan (1969), reductions in product market surplus and allocative inefficiencies due to market power in the domestic cement market counteract the social benefits of carbon abatement. Second, trade exposure to unregulated foreign competitors leads to emissions "leakage" which offsets domestic emissions reductions. Taken together, these forces result in soci...

Published: Meredith Fowlie & Mar Reguant & Stephen P. Ryan, 2016. "Market-Based Emissions Regulation and Industry Dynamics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(1), pages 000 - 000. citation courtesy of

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