Stern School of Business
New York University
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|April 2013||Competitors, Complementors, Parents and Places: Explaining Regional Agglomeration in the U.S. Auto Industry|
with Zhu Wang, Daniel Yi Xu: w18973
Taking the early U.S. automobile industry as an example, we evaluate four competing hypotheses on regional industry agglomeration: intra-industry local externalities, inter-industry local externalities, employee spinouts, and location fixed-effects. Our findings suggest that inter-industry spillovers, particularly the development of the carriage and wagon industry, play an important role. Spinouts play a secondary role and work as a special type of intra-industry spillovers. The presence of other firms in the same industry has a negligible (or even negative) effect. Finally, local inputs account for some agglomeration in the short run, but the effects are much more profound in the long run.
Published: Luís Cabral & Zhu Wang & Daniel Yi Xu, 2018. "Competitors, Complementors, Parents and Places: Explaining Regional Agglomeration in the U.S. Auto Industry," Review of Economic Dynamics, . citation courtesy of
|April 2011||Comment on "How Entrepreneurs Affect the Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity"|
in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited, Josh Lerner and Scott Stern, editors
|March 2004||The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay|
with Ali Hortacsu: w10363
We propose a basic theoretical model of eBay's reputation mechanism, derive a series of implications and empirically test their validity. Our theoretical model features both adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that when a seller receives a negative rating for the first time his reputation decreases and so does his effort level. This implies a decline in sales and price; and an increase in the rate of arrival of subsequent negative feedback. Our model also suggests that sellers with worse records are more likely to exit (and possibly re-enter under a new identity), whereas better sellers have more to gain from buying a reputation' by building up a record of favorable feedback through purchases rather than sales. Our empirical evidence, based on a panel data set of seller feedback h...
Published: LUÍS CABRAL & ALI HORTAÇSU, 2010. "THE DYNAMICS OF SELLER REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM EBAY," The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol 58(1), pages 54-78.