Kimberly Singer Babiarz
117 Encina Commons
Stanford, CA 94305
Institutional Affiliation: Stanford University
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|October 2018||The Limits (and Human Costs) of Population Policy: Fertility Decline and Sex Selection in China under Mao|
with Paul Ma, Grant Miller, Shige Song: w25130
The vast majority of China’s fertility decline predates the famous One Child Policy – and instead occurred under its predecessor, the Later, Longer, Fewer (LLF) fertility control policy. In this paper, we first study LLF’s contribution to marriage and fertility behavior, finding that the policy reduced China’s total fertility rate by about 0.9 births per woman, explaining only 28% of China’s modern fertility decline. Given son preference, we then consider the parallel issue of sex selection, which also emerged prior to the One Child Policy (when prenatal selection was not technologically feasible). We find that LLF increased the use of male-biased fertility stopping rules from 3.25% to 6.3% of couples – and that it contributed to the early emergence of postnatal neglect of girls in modern ...
|October 2014||Family Planning: Program Effects|
with Grant Miller: w20586
This paper reviews empirical evidence on the micro-level consequences of family planning programs in middle- and low-income countries. In doing so, it focuses on fertility outcomes (the number and timing of births), women’s health and socio-economic outcomes (mortality, human capital, and labor force participation), and children’s health and socio-economic outcomes throughout the life cycle. Although effect sizes are heterogeneous, long-term studies imply that in practice, family planning programs may only explain a modest share of fertility decline in real-world settings (explaining 4-20% of fertility decline among studies finding significant effects). Family planning programs may also have quantitatively modest - but practically meaningful - effects on the socio-economic welfare of indi...
Published: Miller, G. and Babiarz, K. S. (2016), Family Planning Program Effects: Evidence from Microdata. Population and Development Review, 42: 7-26. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2016.00109.x
|April 2013||Pay-for-Performance Incentives in Low- and Middle-Income Country Health Programs|
with Grant Miller: w18932
This chapter surveys experience with performance pay in developing country health programs. In doing so, it focuses on four key conceptual issues: (1) What to reward, (2) Who to reward, (3) How to reward, and (4) What unintended consequences might performance incentives create. We highlight that the use of performance pay has outpaced growth in corresponding empirical evidence. Moreover, very little research on performance incentives focuses on the underlying conceptual issues that we outline. We consider these to be important constraints to the design of better performance incentives in low- and middle-income country health programs.
Published: Encyclopedia of Health Economics 2014, Pages 457–466 Cover image Pay-for-Performance Incentives in Low- and Middle-Income Country Health Programs G. Miller K.S. Babiarz