NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Kayleigh Barnes

Schaeffer Center for Health Policy
and Economics
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Verna and Peter Dauterive Hall (VPD)
Los Angeles, CA 90089-7273

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NBER Working Papers and Publications

September 2016Financial Risk Protection from Social Health Insurance
with Arnab Mukherji, Patrick Mullen, Neeraj Sood: w22620
This paper estimates the impact of social health insurance on financial risk reduction by utilizing data from a natural experiment created by the phased roll out of a social health insurance program for the poor in India. We estimate the impact of insurance on the distribution of out-of-pocket costs, frequency and amount of money borrowed for health reasons, and the likelihood of incurring catastrophic health expenditures. We use a stylized expected utility model to compute the welfare effects associated with changes due to insurance in the distribution of out-of-pocket costs. We adjust the standard model to account for the unique conditions of a developing country by incorporating consumption floors, informal borrowing, and selling of assets. These adjustments allow us to estimate the va...

Published: Kayleigh Barnes & Arnab Mukherji & Patrick Mullen & Neeraj Sood, 2017. "Financial risk protection from social health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, . citation courtesy of

October 2015Effects of Payment Reform in More versus Less Competitive Markets
with Neeraj Sood, Abby Alpert, Peter Huckfeldt, Jose Escarce: w21654
Policymakers are increasingly interested in reducing healthcare costs and inefficiencies through innovative payment strategies. These strategies may have heterogeneous impacts across geographic areas, potentially reducing or exacerbating geographic variation in healthcare spending. In this paper, we exploit a major payment reform for home health care to examine whether reductions in reimbursement lead to differential changes in treatment intensity and provider costs depending on the level of competition in a market. Using Medicare claims, we find that while providers in more competitive markets had higher average costs in the pre-reform period, these markets experienced larger proportional reductions in treatment intensity and costs after the reform relative to less competitive markets....

Published: Neeraj Sood & Abby Alpert & Kayleigh Barnes & Peter Huckfeldt & José J. Escarce, 2017. "Effects of payment reform in more versus less competitive markets," Journal of Health Economics, vol 51, pages 66-83.

 
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