Department of Economics
VU Station B# 351828
2301 Vanderbilt Place
Nashville, TN 37235-1828
Tel: (615)322 3237
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|November 2011||Size Inequality, Coordination Externalities and International Trade Agreements|
with Nuno Limao: w17603
Developing countries now account for a significant fraction of both world trade and two thirds of the membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, many are still individually small and thus have a limited ability to bilaterally extract and enforce trade concessions from larger developed economies even though as a group they would be able to do so. We show that this coordination externality generates asymmetric outcomes under agreements that rely on bilateral threats of trade retaliation. such as the WTO. but not under agreements extended to include certain financial instruments. In particular, we find that an extended agreement generates improvements in global efficiency and equity if it Includes the exchange of bonds prior to trading but not if it relies solely on ex-post fi...
Published: LimÃ£o, Nuno & Saggi, Kamal, 2013. "Size inequality, coordination externalities and international trade agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 10-27. citation courtesy of
|October 2009||Intellectual Property Rights, Foreign Direct Investment, and Industrial Development|
with Lee Branstetter: w15393
This paper develops a North-South product model in which Southern imitation and the North-South flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) are endogenously determined. In the model, a strengthening of IPR protection in the South reduces the rate of imitation, which, in turn, increases the flow of FDI. The increase in FDI more than offsets the decline in production undertaken by Southern imitators, so that the South's share of goods produced by the global economy increases. Furthermore, real wages of Southern workers increase even though prices of goods produced by multinationals exceed those of Southern imitators. The preceding results hold when Northern innovation is endogenously determined; in addition, the rate of innovation increases with a strengthening of Southern IPR protection.
Published: Lee Branstetter & Kamal Saggi, 2011. "Intellectual Property Rights, Foreign Direct Investment and Industrial Development," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(555), pages 1161-1191, 09. citation courtesy of
|April 2007||Intellectual Property Rights, Imitation, and Foreign Direct Investment: Theory and Evidence|
with Lee Branstetter, Raymond Fisman, C. Fritz Foley: w13033
This paper theoretically and empirically analyzes the effect of strengthening intellectual property rights in developing countries on the level and composition of industrial development. We develop a North-South product cycle model in which Northern innovation, Southern imitation, and FDI are all endogenous. Our model predicts that IPR reform in the South leads to increased FDI in the North, as Northern firms shift production to Southern affiliates. This FDI accelerates Southern industrial development. The South's share of global manufacturing and the pace at which production of recently invented goods shifts to the South both increase. Additionally, the model also predicts that as production shifts to the South, Northern resources will be reallocated to R&D, driving an increase in th...