Joy Ishii

Compass Lexecon
800 West El Camino Real
Suite 180
Mountain View, CA 94040

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Institutional Affiliation: Compass Lexecon

NBER Working Papers and Publications

March 2010Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States
with Paul A. Gompers, Andrew Metrick
in Corporate Governance, Michael Weisbach, editor
January 2004Incentives vs. Control: An Analysis of U.S. Dual-Class Companies
with Paul A. Gompers, Andrew Metrick: w10240
Dual-class common stock allows for the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights across the different classes of equity. We construct a large sample of dual-class firms in the United States and analyze the relationships of insider's cash flow rights and voting rights with firm value, performance, and investment behavior. We find that relationship of firm value to cash flow rights is positive and concave and the relationship to voting rights is negative and convex. Identical quadratic relationships are found for the respective ownership variables with sales growth, capital expenditures, and the combination of R&D and advertising. Our evidence is consistent with an entrenchment effect of voting control that leads managers to underinvest and an incentive effect of cash flow ownership t...
August 2001Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
with Paul A. Gompers, Andrew Metrick: w8449
Corporate-governance provisions related to takeover defenses and shareholder rights vary substantially across firms. In this paper, we use the incidence of 24 different provisions to build a 'Governance Index' for about 1,500 firms per year, and then we study the relationship between this index and several forward-looking performance measures during the 1990s. We find a striking relationship between corporate governance and stock returns. An investment strategy that bought the firms in the lowest decile of the index (strongest shareholder rights) and sold the firms in the highest decile of the index (weakest shareholder rights) would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per year during the sample period. Furthermore, the Governance Index is highly correlated with firm value. In 1990...

Published: Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance And Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 107-155, February. citation courtesy of

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