Patrick F. Taylor 2164-A
E. J. Ourso College of Business
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA 70803
Institutional Affiliation: Louisiana State University
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|September 2012||The Effects of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance on Michigan's Banks' Survival in the 1930s|
with Charles W. Calomiris, Marc Weidenmier, Katherine Bobroff: w18427
This paper examines the effects of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation's (RFC) loan and preferred stock programs on bank failure rates in Michigan during the period 1932-1934, which includes the important Michigan banking crisis of early 1933 and its aftermath. Using a new database on Michigan banks, we employ probit and survival duration analysis to examine the effectiveness of the RFC's loan program (the policy tool employed before March 1933) and the RFC's preferred stock purchases (the policy tool employed after March 1933) on bank failure rates.
Our estimates treat the receipt of RFC assistance as an endogenous variable. We are able to identify apparently valid and powerful instruments (predictors of RFC assistance that are not directly related to failure risk) for analyzing th...
Published: Calomiris, Charles W. & Mason, Joseph R. & Weidenmier, Marc & Bobroff, Katherine, 2013. "The effects of reconstruction finance corporation assistance on Michigan's banks' survival in the 1930s," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 526-547. citation courtesy of
|July 2012||The Effects of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance on Michigan's Banks' Survival in the 1930s|
with Charles W. Calomiris, Marc Weidenmier, Katherine Bobroff
in The Microeconomics of New Deal Policy, Price Fishback, organizer
|January 2011||Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the Recession of 1937-1938? A Microeconomic Approach|
with Charles W. Calomiris, David Wheelock: w16688
In 1936-37, the Federal Reserve doubled the reserve requirements imposed on member banks. Ever since, the question of whether the doubling of reserve requirements increased reserve demand and produced a contraction of money and credit, and thereby helped to cause the recession of 1937-1938, has been a matter of controversy. Using microeconomic data to gauge the fundamental reserve demands of Fed member banks, we find that despite being doubled, reserve requirements were not binding on bank reserve demand in 1936 and 1937, and therefore could not have produced a significant contraction in the money multiplier. To the extent that increases in reserve demand occurred from 1935 to 1937, they reflected fundamental changes in the determinants of reserve demand and not changes in reserve require...
|January 2004||How to Restructure Failed Banking Systems: Lessons from the United States in the 1930s and Japan in the 1990s|
with Charles Calomiris
in Governance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region, Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger, editors