Joseph Golec

Department of Finance
2100 Hillside Road
Storrs, CT 06269

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org

NBER Working Papers and Publications

April 2009What's the "Interest" in FDA Drug Advisory Committee Conflicts of Interest?
with John Vernon: w14932
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug advisory committee members sometimes have financial interests tied to drug companies. Congress and the public have become concerned that these financial interests lead to conflicts of interest. They conclude that the conflicts bias committee recommendations, and lead to unsafe or ineffective drugs being approved for public consumption, or, conversely, delays in approval of safe and effective drugs. Our paper provides empirical evidence, based on an event study methodology, that advisory committee meetings lead to weak or statistically insignificant effects on stock prices and hence equity values of regulated companies assumed to be affected by the particular matters coming before committee meetings.
November 2007Financial Risk in the Biotechnology Industry
with John A. Vernon: w13604
The biotechnology industry has been an engine of innovation for the U.S. healthcare system and, more generally, the U.S. economy. It is by far the most research intensive industry in the U.S. In our analyses in the current paper, for example, we find that, over the past 25 years, average R&D intensity (R&D spending to total firm assets) for this industry was 38 percent. Consider that over this same period average R&D intensity for all industries was only about 3 percent. In the current paper we examine this industry along a number of dimensions and estimate its average financial risk. Specifically, we use Compustat and Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) data from 1982 to 2005 for firms defined by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) as biotechnology fi...

Published: Appl Health Econ Health Policy. 2009;7(3):155-65. doi: 10.2165/10899620-000000000-00000. Financial risk of the biotech industry versus the pharmaceutical industry.

November 2006European Pharmaceutical Price Regulation, Firm Profitability, and R&D Spending
with John A. Vernon: w12676
EU countries closely regulate pharmaceutical prices whereas the U.S. does not. This paper shows how price constraints affect the profitability, stock returns, and R&D spending of EU and U.S. firms. Compared to EU firms, U.S. firms are more profitable, earn higher stock returns, and spend more on research and development (R&D). Some differences have increased over time. In 1986, EU pharmaceutical R&D exceeded U.S. R&D by about 24 percent, but by 2004, EU R&D trailed U.S. R&D by about 15 percent. During these 19 years, U.S. R&D spending grew at a real annual compound rate of 8.8 percent, while EU R&D spending grew at a real 5.4 percent rate. Results show that EU consumers enjoyed much lower pharmaceutical price inflation, however, at a cost of 46 fewer new medicines introduced by EU firms an...
March 2005Pharmaceutical Stock Price Reactions to Price Constraint Threats and Firm-Level R&D Spending
with Shantaram Hegde, John A. Vernon: w11229
Political pressure in the United States is again building to constrain pharmaceutical prices either directly or through legalized reimportation of lower-priced pharmaceuticals from foreign countries. This study uses the Clinton Administration's Health Security Act (HSA) of 1993 as a natural experiment to show how threats of price constraints affect firm-level R&D spending. We link events surrounding the HSA to pharmaceutical company stock price changes and then examine the cross-sectional relation between the stock price changes and subsequent unexpected R&D spending changes. Results show that the HSA had significant negative effects on firm stock prices and R&D spending. Conservatively, the HSA reduced R&D spending by $1.6 billion, even though it never became law. If the HSA had passed, a...
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