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28014 Madrid, SPAIN
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|November 2007||Firms' Stakeholders and the Costs of Transparency|
with Andres Almazan, Sheridan Titman: w13647
We develop a model of a firm whose production process requires it to start and nurture a relationship with its stakeholders. Because there are spillover benefits associated with being associated with a "winner," the perceptions of stakeholders and potential stakeholders can affect firm value. Our analysis indicates that while transparency (i.e., generating information about a firm's quality) may improve the allocation of resources, a firm may have a higher ex ante value if information about its quality is not prematurely generated. The costs associated with transparency arise because of asymmetric information regarding the extent to which stakeholders benefit from having a relationship with a high quality firm. These costs are higher when firms can initiate non-contractible innovative inve...
Published: Andres Almazan & Javier Suarez & Sheridan Titman, 2009."Firms' Stakeholders and the Costs of Transparency,"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,Blackwell Publishing, vol. 18(3), pages 871-900, 09. citation courtesy of
|September 2007||Firms' Stakeholders and the Costs of Transparency|
with Andres Almazan, Sheridan Titman
in Entrepreneurship: Strategy and Structure, Thomas Hellman and Scott Stern, editors
|November 2003||Stakeholder, Transparency and Capital Structure|
with Andres Almazan, Sheridan Titman: w10101
Firms that are more highly levered are forced to raise capital more often, a process that generates information about them. Of course transparency can improve the allocation of capital. However, when the information about the firm affects the terms under which the firm transacts with its customers and employees, transparency can have an offsetting negative effect. Under relatively general conditions, good news improves these terms of trade less than bad news worsens them, implying that increased transparency can lower firm value. In addition, we show that transparency can reduce the incentives of firms and stakeholders to undertake relationship specific investments. The negative effects of transparency can lead firms to pass up positive NPV investments that require external funding and to ...