Department of Economics and Finance
College of Business
University of Wyoming
P.O. Box 3985
Laramie, WY 82071-3985
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|December 2008||Rebate Rules in Threshold Public Good Provision|
with Michael A. Spencer, Stephen K. Swallow, John A. List: w14559
This paper considers how six alternative rebate rules affect voluntary contributions in a threshold public-good experiment. The rules differ by (1) whether an individual can receive a proportional rebate of excess contributions, a winner-takes-all of any excess contributions, or a full rebate of one's contribution in the event the public good is provided and excess contributions exist, and (2) whether the probability of receiving a rebate is proportional to an individual's contribution relative to total contributions or is a simple uniform probability distribution set by the number of contributors. The paper adds to the existing experimental economics literature on threshold public goods by investigating both aggregate and individual demand revelation under the winner-take-all and random f...
Published: Spencer, Michael A. & Swallow, Stephen K. & Shogren, Jason F. & List, John A., 2009.
"Rebate rules in threshold public good provision,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 93(5-6), pages 798-806, June.
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