Itamar Drechsler

Stern School of Business
New York University
44 West Fourth Street, 9-120
New York, NY 10012
Tel: 212/998-0336
Fax: 212/995-4256

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
NBER Program Affiliations: AP
NBER Affiliation: Research Associate

NBER Working Papers and Publications

April 2016The Deposits Channel of Monetary Policy
with Alexi Savov, Philipp Schnabl: w22152
We present a new channel for the transmission of monetary policy, the deposits channel. We show that when the Fed funds rate rises, banks widen the spreads they charge on deposits, and deposits flow out of the banking system. We present a model where this is due to market power in deposit markets. Consistent with the market power mechanism, deposit spreads increase more and deposits flow out more in concentrated markets. This is true even when we control for lending opportunities by only comparing different branches of the same bank. Since deposits are the main source of liquid assets for households, the deposits channel can explain the observed strong relationship between the liquidity premium and the Fed funds rate. Since deposits are also a uniquely stable funding source for banks, the ...
July 2014The Shorting Premium and Asset Pricing Anomalies
with Qingyi Freda Drechsler: w20282
Short-rebate fees are a strong predictor of the cross-section of stock returns, both gross and net of fees. We document a large "shorting premium": the cheap-minus-expensive-to-short (CME) portfolio of stocks has a monthly average gross return of 1.43%, a net return of 0.91%, and a 1.53% four-factor alpha. We show that short fees interact strongly with the returns to eight of the largest and most well-known cross-sectional anomalies. The anomalies effectively disappear within the 80% of stocks that have low short fees, but are greatly amplified among those with high fees. We propose a joint explanation for these findings: the shorting premium is compensation for the concentrated short risk borne by the small fraction of investors who do most shorting. Because it is on the short side, it r...
May 2014A Model of Monetary Policy and Risk Premia
with Alexi Savov, Philipp Schnabl: w20141
We develop a dynamic asset pricing model in which monetary policy affects the risk premium component of the cost of capital. Risk-tolerant agents (banks) borrow from risk-averse agents (i.e. take deposits) to fund levered investments. Leverage exposes banks to funding risk, which they insure by holding liquidity buffers. By changing the nominal rate the central bank influences the liquidity premium in financial markets, and hence the cost of taking leverage. Lower nominal rates make liquidity cheaper and raise leverage, resulting in lower risk premia and higher asset prices, volatility, investment, and growth. We analyze forward guidance, a "Greenspan put", and the yield curve.
June 2011A Pyrrhic Victory? - Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk
with Viral V. Acharya, Philipp Schnabl: w17136
We show that financial sector bailouts and sovereign credit risk are intimately linked. A bailout benefits the economy by ameliorating the under-investment problem of the financial sector. However, increasing taxation of the non-financial sector to fund the bailout may be inefficient since it weakens its incentive to invest, decreasing growth. Instead, the sovereign may choose to fund the bailout by diluting existing government bondholders, resulting in a deterioration of the sovereign's creditworthiness. This deterioration feeds back onto the financial sector, reducing the value of its guarantees and existing bond holdings and increasing its sensitivity to future sovereign shocks. We provide empirical evidence for this two-way feedback between financial and sovereign credit risk using ...

Published: A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk Authors VIRAL ACHARYA, ITAMAR DRECHSLER, Philipp Schnab Volume 69, Issue 6 December 2014 Pages 2689–2739 l

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