Rotman School of Management
University of Toronto
105 St. George St.
Toronto, ON M5S 3E6
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|October 2016||Vertical Information Restraints: Pro- and Anti-Competitive Impacts of Minimum Advertised Price Restrictions|
with John Asker: w22771
We consider vertical contracts where the retail market may involve search frictions. Minimum advertised price restrictions (MAP) act as a restraint on customers’ information and so can increase search frictions in the retail sector. Such restraints, thereby, soften retail competition—an impact also generated by resale price maintenance (RPM). However, by accommodating (consumer or retailer) heterogeneity, MAP can allow for higher manufacturer profits than RPM. We show that they can do so through facilitating price discrimination among consumers; encouraging service provision; and facilitating manufacturer collusion. Thus, welfare effects may be positive or negative compared to RPM or to the absence of such restrictions.
|December 2010||Exclusionary Minimum Resale Price Maintenance|
with John Asker: w16564
An upstream manufacturer can use minimum retail price maintenance (RPM) to exclude potential competitors. RPM lets the incumbent manufacturer transfer profits to retailers. If entry is accommodated, upstream competition leads to fierce down- stream competition and the breakdown of RPM. Hence, via RPM, retailers internalize the effect of accommodating entry on the incumbent's profits. Retailers may prefer not to accommodate entry; and, if entry requires downstream accommodation, entry can be deterred. We investigate when an incumbent would prefer to exclude, rather than collude with, the entrant and the effect of a retailer cartel. We also consider the effect of imperfect competition. Empirical and policy implications are discussed.
Published: Raising Retailers Prots: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals, (with Heski Bar-Isaac), American Economic Review , 104(2), 672-686, 2014.