Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|January 2010||Pay-to-Bid Auctions|
with Brennan C. Platt, Joseph Price: w15695
We analyze a new auction format in which bidders pay a fee each time they increase the auction price. Bidding fees are the primary source of revenue for the seller, but produce the same expected revenue as standard auctions. Our model predicts a particular distribution of ending prices, which we test against observed auction data. Our model fits the data well for over three-fourths of routinely auctioned items. The notable exceptions are video game paraphernalia, which show more aggressive bidding and higher expected revenue. By incorporating mild risk-loving preferences in the model, we explain nearly all of the auctions.
Published: The Role of Risk Preferences in Pay-to-Bid Auctions Autores: Brennan C. Platt, Joseph Price, Henry Tappen Localización: Management science: journal of the Institute for operations research and the management sciences, ISSN 0025-1909, Vol. 59, Nº. 9, 2013, págs. 2117-2134
|February 2009||Interracial Workplace Cooperation: Evidence from the NBA|
with Joseph Price, Lars Lefgren: w14749
Using data from the National Basketball Association (NBA), we examine whether patterns of workplace cooperation occur disproportionately among workers of the same race. We find that, holding constant the composition of teammates on the floor, basketball players are no more likely to complete an assist to a player of the same race than a player of a different race. Our confidence interval allows us to reject even small amounts of same-race bias in passing patterns. Our findings suggest that high levels of interracial cooperation can occur in a setting where workers are operating in a highly visible setting with strong incentives to behave efficiently.
Published: Joseph Price & Lars Lefgren & Henry Tappen, 2013. "Interracial Workplace Cooperation: Evidence From The Nba," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 1026-1034, 01. citation courtesy of