Research Institute of Industrial Economics
Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|December 2006||Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts|
with Giovanni Maggi, Robert W. Staiger: w12745
We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and as a consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. In spite of its simplicity, the model yields rich predictions on the structure of the optimal trade agreement and how this depends on the fundamentals of the contracting environment. We argue that taking contracting costs explicitly into account can help explain a number of key features of real trade agreements.
Published: Henrik Horn & Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2010.
"Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 394-419, March.
citation courtesy of
|June 1997||Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization|
with James Levinsohn: w6077
This paper is about the interactions between what is traditionally considered trade policy and a narrow but important aspect of competition policy, namely merger policy. We focus on links between merger policies and trade liberalization. We put special emphasis on the topical issue of the role that international agreements such as the GATT play when merger policies are nationally chosen. Of particular concern is the possibility that liberalization of international trade will induce countries to increasingly use competition policies to promote national interests at the expense of others. We examine the incentives for a welfare maximizing government to make such a substitution. Interpreting merger policy as a choice of degree of industrial concentration, we investigate how the merger po...
Published: Horn, Henrik & Levinsohn, James, 2001. "Merger Policies and Trade Liberalisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 244-76, April. citation courtesy of
|February 1987||Infant-Industry Protection Reconsidered: The Case of Informational Barriers to Entry|
with Gene M. Grossman: w2159
In industries with imperfect consumer information, the lack of a reputation puts latecomers at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis established firms. We consider whether the existence of such informational barriers to entry provides a valid reason for temporarily protecting infant producers of experience goods and services. Our model incorporates both moral hazard in an individual firm's choice of quality and adverse selection among potential entrants into the industry. We find that infant-industry protection often exacerbates the welfare loss associated with these market imperfections.
Published: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. CIII, No. 415, Issue 4,pp. 767-787, (November 1988). citation courtesy of