Landau Economics Building
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Stanford, CA 94305
Institutional Affiliation: Stanford University
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|June 2018||Do CEOs Know Best? Evidence from China|
with Nicholas Bloom, Hong Cheng, Mark Duggan, Hongbin Li: w24760
We analyze a new management survey for around 1,000 firms and 10,000 employees across two large provinces in China. The unique aspect of this survey is it collected management data from the CEO, a random sample of senior managers and workers. We document four main results. First, management scores, much like productivity, have a wide spread with a long left-tail of poorly managed firms. This distribution of management scores is similar for CEOs, senior managers and workers management, and appears broadly reasonably compared to US scores for similar questions. Moreover, for all groups these scores correlate with firm performance, suggesting all employees within the firm are (at least partly) aware of the their firms’ managerial abilities. Second, the scores across the groups are significant...
|January 2018||The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco|
with Rebecca Diamond, Timothy McQuade: w24181
We exploit quasi-experimental variation in assignment of rent control to study its impacts on tenants, landlords, and the overall rental market. Leveraging new data tracking individuals’ migration, we find rent control increased renters’ probabilities of staying at their addresses by nearly 20%. Landlords treated by rent control reduced rental housing supply by 15%, causing a 5.1% city-wide rent increase. Using a dynamic, neighborhood choice model, we find rent control offered large benefits to covered tenants. Welfare losses from decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against rent increases were provided as government social insurance, instead of a regulated landlord mandate.