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NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Eric Talley

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NBER Working Papers and Publications

October 2006Optimal Liability for Terrorism
with Darius Lakdawalla: w12578
This paper analyzes the normative role for civil liability in aligning terrorism precaution incentives, when the perpetrators of terrorism are unreachable by courts or regulators. We consider the strategic interaction among targets, subsidiary victims, and terrorists within a sequential, game-theoretic model. The model reveals that, while an "optimal" liability regime indeed exists, its features appear at odds with conventional legal templates. For example, it frequently prescribes damages payments from seemingly unlikely defendants, directing them to seemingly unlikely plaintiffs. The challenge of introducing such a regime using existing tort law doctrines, therefore, is likely to be prohibitive. Instead, we argue, efficient precaution incentives may be best provided by alternative policy...
 
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