Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|February 2015||The Dynamics of Financially Constrained Arbitrage|
with Dimitri Vayanos: w20968
We develop a model of financially constrained arbitrage, and use it to study the dynamics of arbitrage capital, liquidity, and asset prices. Arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies between assets traded in segmented markets, and in doing so provide liquidity to investors. A collateral constraint limits their positions as a function of capital. We show that the dynamics of arbitrage activity are self-correcting: following a shock that depletes arbitrage capital, profitability increases, and this allows capital to be gradually replenished. Spreads increase more and recover faster for more volatile trades, although arbitrageurs cut their positions in these trades the least. When arbitrage capital is more mobile across markets, liquidity in each market generally becomes less volatile, but the...
Published: DENIS GROMB & DIMITRI VAYANOS, 2018. "The Dynamics of Financially Constrained Arbitrage," The Journal of Finance, vol 73(4), pages 1713-1750. citation courtesy of
|May 2011||Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers|
with Mike Burkart, Holger M. Mueller, Fausto Panunzi: w17010
We study the role of legal investor protection for the efficiency of the market for corporate control. Stronger legal investor protection limits the ease with which an acquirer, once in control, can extract private benefits at the expense of non-controlling investors. This, in turn, increases the acquirer's capacity to raise outside funds to finance the takeover. Absent effective competition for the target, the increased outside funding capacity does not make efficient takeovers more likely, however, because the bid price, and thus the acquirer's need for funds, increase in lockstep with his pledgeable income. In contrast, under effective competition, the increased outside funding capacity makes it less likely that the takeover outcome is determined by the bidders' financing constraints-an...
Published: Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers With M. Burkart, D. Gromb, and F. P anunzi, Journal of Finance 69, 1129-1165, 2014 citation courtesy of
|March 2010||Limits of Arbitrage: The State of the Theory|
with Dimitri Vayanos: w15821
We survey theoretical developments in the literature on the limits of arbitrage. This literature investigates how costs faced by arbitrageurs can prevent them from eliminating mispricings and providing liquidity to other investors. Research in this area is currently evolving into a broader agenda emphasizing the role of financial institutions and agency frictions for asset prices. This research has the potential to explain so-called "market anomalies" and inform welfare and policy debates about asset markets. We begin with examples of demand shocks that generate mispricings, arguing that they can stem from behavioral or from institutional considerations. We next survey, and nest within a simple model, the following costs faced by arbitrageurs: (i) risk, both fundamental and non-fundamental...
Published: Limits of Arbitrage: The State of the Theory, Annual Review of Financial Economics, 2010, 2, 251-275. (With Denis Gromb)
|June 2002||Entrepreneurship in Equilibrium|
with David Scharfstein: w9001
This paper compares the financing of new ventures in start-ups (entrepreneurship) and in established firms (intrapreneurship). Intrapreneurship allows established firms to use information on failed intrapreneurs to redeploy them into other jobs. By contrast, failed entrepreneurs must seek other jobs in an imperfectly informed external labor market. While this external labor market leads to ex post inefficient allocations, it provides entrepreneurs with high-powered incentives ex ante. We show that two types of equilibria can arise (and sometimes coexist). In a low entrepreneurship equilibrium, the market for failed entrepreneurs is thin, making internal labor markets and intrapreneurship particularly valuable. In a high entrepreneurship equilibrium, the active labor market reduces the...