Darren J. Kisgen
Fulton Hall, Finance Department
140 Commonwealth Av.
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|August 2016||Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias?|
with Matthew Osborn, Jonathan Reuter: w22477
We examine whether credit rating agencies reward accurate or biased analysts. Using data collected from Moody’s corporate debt credit reports, we find that Moody’s is more likely to promote analysts who are accurate, but less likely to promote analysts who downgrade frequently. Combined, analysts who are accurate but not overly negative are approximately twice as likely to get promoted. Further, analysts whose rating changes are more informative to the market are more likely to get promoted, unless their ratings changes cause large negative market reactions. Moody’s balances a desire for accuracy with a desire to cater to its corporate clients.
|April 2009||Do Regulations Based on Credit Ratings Affect a Firm's Cost of Capital?|
with Philip E. Strahan: w14890
In February 2003, the SEC officially certified a fourth credit rating agency, Dominion Bond Rating Service ("DBRS"), for use in bond investment regulations. After DBRS certification, bond yields change in the direction implied by the firm's DBRS rating relative to its ratings from other certified rating agencies. A one notch better DBRS rating corresponds to a 39 basis point reduction in a firm's debt cost of capital. The impact on yields is driven by cases where the DBRS rating is better than other ratings and is larger among bonds rated near the investment-grade cutoff. These findings indicate that ratings-based regulations on bond investment affect a firm's cost of debt capital.
Published: Do Regulations Based on Credit Ratings Affect a Firm's Cost of Capital? Authors: Kisgen, Darren J.; Strahan, Philip E. Source: Review of Financial Studies, 18 December 2010, vol. 23, no. 12, pp. 4324-4347(24)