Daniel Ortega

Banco de Desarrollo de America Latina (CAF) &
Instituto de Estudios Superiores
de Administracion
Centro de Politicas Publicas
Ave. IESA, Edif. IESA
San Bernardino, Caracas 1010

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NBER Working Papers and Publications

October 2017Pushing Crime Around the Corner? Estimating Experimental Impacts of Large-Scale Security Interventions
with Christopher Blattman, Donald Green, Santiago Tobón: w23941
Bogotá intensified state presence to make high-crime streets safer. We show that spillovers outweighed direct effects on security. We randomly assigned 1,919 “hot spot” streets to eight months of doubled policing, increased municipal services, both, or neither. Spillovers in dense networks cause “fuzzy clustering,” and we show valid hypothesis testing requires randomization inference. State presence improved security on hot spots. But data from all streets suggest that intensive policing pushed property crime around the corner, with ambiguous impacts on violent crime. Municipal services had positive but imprecise spillovers. These results contrast with prior studies concluding policing has positive spillovers.
April 2009The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta
with Chang-Tai Hsieh, Edward Miguel, Francisco Rodriguez: w14923
In 2004, the Chávez regime in Venezuela distributed the list of several million voters whom had attempted to remove him from office throughout the government bureaucracy, allegedly to identify and punish these voters. We match the list of petition signers distributed by the government to household survey respondents to measure the economic effects of being identified as a Chavez political opponent. We find that voters who were identified as Chavez opponents experienced a 5 percent drop in earnings and a 1.5 percentage point drop in employment rates after the voter list was released. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the loss aggregate TFP from the misallocation of workers across jobs was substantial, on the order of 3 percent of GDP.

Published: Hsieh, Chang-Tai, Edward Miguel, Daniel Ortega, and Francisco Rodriguez. 2011. "The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(2): 196-214. DOI: 10.1257/app.3.2.196 citation courtesy of

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