Daniel H. Karney
Department of Economics
Athens, OH 45701
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|July 2014||Multiple Pollutants, Uncovered Sectors, and Suboptimal Environmental Policies|
with Don Fullerton: w20334
In our analytical general equilibrium model where two polluting inputs can be substitutes or complements in production, we study the effects of a tax on one pollutant in two cases: one where both pollutants face taxes and the second where the other pollutant is subject to a permit policy. In each case, we solve for closed-form solutions that highlight important parameters. We demonstrate two important ways that environmental taxes and permits are not equivalent. First, the change in the pollutant facing a tax increase depends on whether the other pollutant is subject to a tax or permit policy. Second, if that other pollutant is subject to a tax, then general equilibrium effects can increase or decrease its quantity (affecting overall welfare). However, when the second pollutant is sub...
|March 2013||Leakage, Welfare, and Cost-Effectiveness of Carbon Policy|
with Kathy Baylis, Don Fullerton: w18898
We extend the model of Fullerton, Karney, and Baylis (2012 working paper) to explore cost-effectiveness of unilateral climate policy in the presence of leakage. We ignore the welfare gain from reducing greenhouse gas emissions and focus on the welfare cost of the emissions tax or permit scheme. Whereas that prior paper solves for changes in emissions quantities and finds that leakage may be negative, we show here that all cases with negative leakage in that model are cases where a unilateral carbon tax results in a welfare loss. With positive leakage, however, a unilateral policy can improve welfare.
Published: Kathy Baylis & Don Fullerton & Daniel H. Karney, 2013. "Leakage, Welfare, and Cost-Effectiveness of Carbon Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 332-37, May. citation courtesy of
|April 2011||Negative Leakage|
with Don Fullerton, Kathy Baylis: w17001
We build a simple analytical general equilibrium model and linearize it, to find a closed-from expression for the effect of a small change in carbon tax on leakage - the increase in emissions elsewhere. The model has two goods produced in two sectors or regions. Many identical consumers buy both goods using income from a fixed stock of capital that is mobile between sectors. An increase in one sector's carbon tax raises the price of its output, so consumption shifts to the other good, causing positive carbon leakage. However, the taxed sector substitutes away from carbon into capital. It thus absorbs capital, which shrinks the other sector, causing negative leakage. This latter effect could swamp the former, reducing carbon emissions in both sectors.
Published: Negative Leakage (with Kathy Baylis and Daniel Karney), Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (2014) citation courtesy of