NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Daniel Diermeier

University of Chicago

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NBER Working Papers and Publications

December 2013Endogenous Property Rights
with Georgy Egorov, Konstantin Sonin: w19734
It is often argued that additional checks and balances provide economic agents with better protection from expropriation of their wealth or productive capital. We demonstrate that in a dynamic political economy model this intuition may be flawed. Surprisingly, increasing the number of veto players or the majority requirement for redistribution may reduce property right protection on the equilibrium path. The reason is the existence of two distinct mechanisms of property rights protection. One are formal constraints that allow individuals or groups to block any redistribution which is not in their favor. The other occurs in equilibrium where agents without such powers protect each other from redistribution. Players without formal blocking power anticipate that the expropriation of other sim...
February 2007Innovating under Pressure - Towards a Science of Crisis Management
with Wallace J. Hopp, Seyed Iravani
in Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 7, Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner and Scott Stern, editors
 
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