NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Clement Imbert

Department of Economics
The Social Sciences Building
The University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

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NBER Working Papers and Publications

November 2016E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India
with Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Santhosh Mathew, Rohini Pande: w22803
In collaboration with the Government of Bihar, India, we conducted a large-scale experiment to evaluate whether transparency in fiscal transfer systems can increase accountability and reduce corruption in the implementation of a workfare program. The reforms introduced electronic fund-flow, cut out administrative tiers, and switched the basis of transfer amounts from forecasts to documented expenditures. Treatment reduced leakages along three measures: expenditures and hours claimed dropped while an independent household survey found no impact on actual employment and wages received; a matching exercise reveals a reduction in fake households on payrolls; and local program officials’ self-reported median personal assets fell.
 
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