Dept. of Finance
University of Illinois, 1206 S. Sixth St.
340 Wohlers Hall
Champaign IL 61820
Institutional Affiliation: University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|January 1996||The Efficiency of Self-Regulated Payments Systems: Learning From the Suffolk System|
with Charles W. Calomiris: w5442
This paper analyzes the operation of the Suffolk System, an interbank note-clearing network operating throughout New England from the 1820s through the 1850s. Banks made markets in each other's notes at par, which allowed New England to avoid discounting of bank notes in trade. Privately enforced regu- lations prevented free riding in the form of excessive risk taking. Observers of the Suffolk System have been divided. Some emphasized the stability and effi these arrangements. Others argued that the arrangements were motivated by rent-seeking on the part of Boston banks, and were primarily coervice and exploitative. In the neighboring Mid-Atlantic states, regulations limited the potential for developing a regional clearing system centered in New York City on the model of the Suffolk Syst...
- Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 28, no. 4, part 2 (November 1996): 766-797 citation courtesy of
- Published as Calomiris, Charles W., "Gauging the Efficiency of Bank Consolidation During a Merger Wave," Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 23, nos. 2-4 (February 1999): 615-621.
- Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, 1996. "The efficiency of self-regulated payments systems: learning from the Suffolk System," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 766-803. citation courtesy of
|May 1981||Wage-Employment Contracts: Global Results|
with Jerry R. Green: w0675
This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. The firms ' superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance. Under plausible assumptions, such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk. It is shown that, if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk neutral, employment is always above the efficient level. Such a one-period implicit contracting model cannot, therefore, be used to "explain" unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information.
Published: Green, Jerry R. and Kahn, Charles M. "Wage-Employment Contracts: Global Results." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, Supplement, (1983), pp. 173-188.