The World Bank
1818 H Street
Washington, DC 20433
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|January 2008||The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship|
with Simeon Djankov, Tim Ganser, Rita Ramalho, Andrei Shleifer: w13756
We present new data on effective corporate income tax rates in 85 countries in 2004. The data come from a survey, conducted jointly with PricewaterhouseCoopers, of all taxes imposed on "the same" standardized mid-size domestic firm. In a cross-section of countries, our estimates of the effective corporate tax rate have a large adverse impact on aggregate investment, FDI, and entrepreneurial activity. For example, a 10 percent increase in the effective corporate tax rate reduces aggregate investment to GDP ratio by 2 percentage points. Corporate tax rates are also negatively correlated with growth, and positively correlated with the size of the informal economy. The results are robust to the inclusion of controls for other tax rates, quality of tax administration, security of property...
Published: Simeon Djankov & Tim Ganser & Caralee McLiesh & Rita Ramalho & Andrei Shleifer, 2010.
"The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship,"
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 31-64, July.
citation courtesy of
|December 2006||Debt Enforcement Around the World|
with Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer: w12807
We present insolvency practitioners from 88 countries with an identical case of a hotel about to default on its debt, and ask them to describe in detail how debt enforcement against this hotel will proceed in their countries. We use the data on time, cost, and the likely disposition of the assets (preservation as a going concern versus piecemeal sale) to construct a measure of the efficiency of debt enforcement in each country. We identify several characteristics of debt enforcement procedures, such as the structure of appeals and availability of floating charge finance, that influence efficiency. Our measure of efficiency of debt enforcement is strongly correlated with per capita income and legal origin and predicts debt market development across countries. Interestingly, it is also h...
Published: Simeon Djankov & Oliver Hart & Caralee McLiesh & Andrei Shleifer, 2008. "Debt Enforcement around the World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(6), pages 1105-1149, December. citation courtesy of
|January 2005||Private Credit in 129 Countries|
with Simeon Djankov, Andrei Shleifer: w11078
We investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights and private and public credit registries in 129 countries. We find that both creditor protection through the legal system and information sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to GDP, but that the former is relatively more important in the richer countries. An analysis of legal reforms also shows that improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing precede faster credit growth. We also find that creditor rights are extremely stable over time, contrary to the convergence hypothesis. Finally, we find that legal origins are an important determinant of both creditor rights and information sharing institutions.
Published: Djankov, Simeon & McLiesh, Caralee & Shleifer, Andrei, 2007. "Private credit in 129 countries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 299-329, May. citation courtesy of
|May 2001||Who Owns the Media?|
with Simeon Djankov, Tatiana Nenova, Andrei Shleifer: w8288
We examine the patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world. We find that almost universally the largest media firms are owned by the government or by private families. Government ownership is more pervasive in broadcasting than in the printed media. Government ownership of the media is generally associated with less press freedom, fewer political and economic rights, and, most conspicuously, inferior social outcomes in the areas of education and health. It does not appear that adverse consequences of government ownership of the media are restricted solely to the instances of government monopoly.
Published: Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova and Andrei Shleifer. "Who Owns The Media?," Journal of Law and Economics, 2003, v46(2,Oct), 341-382. citation courtesy of