Department of Economics
London School of Economics
London WC2A 2AE
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|March 2013||Migration and Wage Effects of Taxing Top Earners: Evidence from the Foreigners' Tax Scheme in Denmark|
with Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Emmanuel Saez, Esben Anton Schultz: w18885
This paper analyzes the effects of income taxation on the international migration and earnings of top earners using a Danish preferential foreigner tax scheme and population-wide Danish administrative data. This scheme, introduced in 1991, allows new immigrants with high earnings to be taxed at a preferential flat rate for a duration of three years. We obtain three main results. First, the scheme has doubled the number of highly paid foreigners in Denmark relative to slightly less paid ineligible foreigners, which translates into a very large elasticity of migration with respect to the net-of-tax rate on foreigners, between 1.5 and 2. Hence, preferential tax schemes for highly paid foreign workers could create severe tax competition between countries. Second, we find compelling evidence of...
Published: Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Camille Landais & Esben Schultz, 2013. "Migration and Wage Effects of Taxing Top Earners: Evidence from the Foreigners' Tax Scheme in Denmark," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 129(1), pages 333-378. citation courtesy of
|November 2010||Taxation and International Migration of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market|
with Henrik Kleven, Emmanuel Saez: w16545
This paper analyzes the effects of top earnings tax rates on the international migration of football players in Europe. We construct a panel dataset of top earnings tax rates, football player careers, and club performances in the first leagues of 14 Western European countries since 1985. We identify the effects of top earnings tax rates on migration using a number of tax and institutional changes: (a) the 1995 Bosman ruling which liberalized the European football market, (b) top tax rate reforms within countries, and (c) special tax schemes offering preferential tax rates to immigrant football players. We start by presenting reduced-form graphical evidence showing large and compelling migration responses to country-specific tax reforms and labor market regulation. We then develop a multino...
Published: Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Camille Landais & Emmanuel Saez, 2013. "Taxation and International Migration of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 1892-1924, August. citation courtesy of
|A Macroeconomic Theory of Optimal Unemployment Insurance|
with Pascal Michaillat, Emmanuel Saez: w16526
We develop a theory of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) that accounts for workers’ job-search behavior and firms’ hiring behavior. The optimal replacement rate of UI is the conventional Baily -Chetty [2006a] rate, which solves the trade-off between insurance and job-search incentives, plus a correction term, which is positive when UI brings the labor market tightness closer to efficiency. For instance, when tightness is inefficiently low, optimal UI is more generous than the Baily-Chetty rate if UI raises tightness and less generous if UI lowers tightness. We propose empirical criteria to determine whether tightness is inefficiently high or low and whether UI raises or lowers tightness. The theory has implications for the cyclicality of optimal UI.
|May 2010||Are Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving Efficient? Evidence from France|
with Gabrielle Fack
in Income Taxation, Trans-Atlantic Public Economics Seminar (TAPES), Roger Gordon and Thomas Piketty, organizers