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NBER Working Papers and Publications
|September 2008||Long-Term Care of the Disabled Elderly: Do Children Increase Caregiving by Spouses?|
with Liliana E. Pezzin, Robert A. Pollak: w14328
Do adult children affect the care elderly parents provide each other? We develop two models in which the anticipated behavior of adult children provides incentives for elderly parents to increase care for their disabled spouses. The "demonstration effect" postulates that adult children learn from a parent's example that family caregiving is appropriate behavior. The "punishment effect" postulates that adult children may punish parents who fail to provide spousal care by not providing future care for the nondisabled spouse when necessary. Thus, joint children act as a commitment mechanism, increasing the probability that elderly spouses will provide care for each other; stepchildren with weak attachments to their parents provide weaker incentives for spousal care than joint children. ...
Published: Liliana Pezzin & Robert Pollak & Barbara Schone, 2009. "Long-term care of the disabled elderly: do children increase caregiving by spouses?," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 323-339, September. citation courtesy of
|July 2006||Efficiency in Family Bargaining: Living Arrangements and Caregiving Decisions of Adult Children and Disabled Elderly Parents|
with Liliana E. Pezzin, Robert A. Pollak: w12358
In this paper, we use a two-stage bargaining model to analyze the living arrangement of a disabled elderly parent and the assistance provided to the parent by her adult children. The first stage determines the living arrangement: the parent can live in a nursing home, live alone in the community, or live with any child who has invited coresidence. The second stage determines the assistance provided by each child in the family. Working by backward induction, we first calculate the level of assistance that each child would provide to the parent in each possible living arrangement. Using these calculations, we then analyze the living arrangement that would emerge from the first stage game. A key assumption of our model is that family members cannot or will not make binding agreements at the f...
Published: Liliana E. Pezzin & Robert A. Pollak & Barbara S. Schone, 2007. "Efficiency in Family Bargaining: Living Arrangements and Caregiving Decisions of Adult Children and Disabled Elderly Parents," CESifo Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 69-96, March. citation courtesy of