Anne C. Sibert
Department of Economics, Mathematics
University of London
Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|July 2004||Deflationary Bubbles|
with Willem H. Buiter: w10642
We analyse deflationary bubbles in a model where money is the only financial asset. We show that such bubbles are consistent with the household's transversality condition if and only if the nominal money stock is falling. Our results are in sharp contrast to those in several prominent contributions to the literature, where deflationary bubbles are ruled out by appealing to a non-standard transversality condition, originally due to Brock. This condition, which we dub the GABOR condition, states that the consumer must be indifferent between reducing his money holdings by one unit and leaving them unchanged and enjoying the discounted present value of the marginal utility of that unit of money forever. We show that the GABOR condition is not part of the necessary and sufficient conditions for...
Published: Buiter, Willem H. & Sibert, Anne C., 2007. "Deflationary Bubbles," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(04), pages 431-454, September. citation courtesy of
|November 2003||Cross-Border Tax Externalities: Are Budget Deficits Too Small?|
with Willem Buiter: w10110
In a dynamic optimising model with costly tax collection, a tax cut by one nation creates positive externalities for the rest of the world if initial public debt stocks are positive. By reducing tax collection costs, current tax cuts boost the resources available for current private consumption, lowering the global interest rate. This pecuniary externality benefits other countries because it reduces the tax collection costs for foreign governments of current and future debt service. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, nationalistic governments do not allow for the effect of lower domestic taxes on debt service costs abroad. Taxes are too high and government budget deficits too low compared to the global cooperative equilibrium. Even in the cooperative equilibrium complete tax smoothing is ...
|November 1997||Transition Issues for the European Monetary Union|
with Willem H. Buiter: w6292
If Stage Three of EMU starts on January 1, 1999, transition issues remain on two time scales. Until July 1, 2002, national currencies and the euro co-exist as legal tender. We argue that intra-EMU currency risk exists in principle during that period, but that no EMU member can be forced out through speculative attacks. Cohabitation of Ins and Outs has an open-ended time scale. We discuss the effect of EMU on incentives for both Ins and Outs to undertake structural reform and the coordination problems associated with the distribution of seigniorage revenue and the Stability and Growth Pact.
Published: DeEmu in Breed Perspectiet; Preadviezen 1997, Koninklijke Vereniging voo rde Stathuishoudkunde, pp. 1-17; Lemma BV, Utrecht, 1997.
|February 1986||Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles|
with Kenneth Rogoff: w1838
There is an extensive empirical literature on political business cycles, but its theoretical foundations are grounded in pre-rational expectations macroeconomic theory. Here we show that electoral cycles in taxes, government spending and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process. The cycleis driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example,the government has more current information on its performance in providing for national defense. Incumbents cheat least when their private informationis either extremely favorable or extremely unfavorable. An exogenous increase in the incumbent partyts popularity does not necessarily imply a damped policy cycle.
Published: Rogoff, Kenneth and Anne Sibert. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles." From Review of Economic Studies, Vol. LV (55), No. 181, pp. 1-16, January 1988. citation courtesy of