European Business School
39 Boulevard Marat
75016, Paris, France
and Paris School of Economics
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|May 2014||Floating a "Lifeboat": The Banque de France and the Crisis of 1889|
with Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur, Eugene N. White: w20083
When faced with a run on a "systemically important" but insolvent bank in 1889, the Banque de France pre-emptively organized a lifeboat to ensure that depositors were protected and an orderly liquidation could proceed. To protect the Banque from losses on its lifeboat loan, a guarantee syndicate was formed, penalizing those who had participated in the copper speculation that had caused the crisis bringing the bank down. Creation of the syndicate and other actions were consistent with mitigating the moral hazard from such an intervention. This episode contrasts the advice given by Bagehot to the Bank of England to counter a panic by lending freely at a high rate on good collateral, allowing insolvent institutions to fail.
Published: Hautcoeur, Pierre-Cyrille & Riva, Angelo & White, Eugene N., 2014. "Floating a “lifeboat”: The Banque de France and the crisis of 1889," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 104-119. citation courtesy of
|January 2010||Danger on the Exchange: How Counterparty Risk Was Managed on the Paris Bourse in the Nineteenth Century|
with Eugene N. White: w15634
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the struggles of Paris Bourse to manage counterparty risk revealed the awkward choices that face derivatives exchanges. Shortly after it was founded, the stock exchange, primarily a forward market, instituted a mutual guarantee fund to prevent broker failures from snowballing into a general liquidity crisis. The creation of the fund then forced the Bourse to search for mechanisms to control moral hazard. To study the determinants of broker failures, we collected new individual data on defaulting brokers and describe the evolving regulatory regime. To identify the factors behind the annual number of broker failures we use negative binominal regressions. To explain individual brokers' duration in office, we employ a proportional hazard model, wh...