NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Alexander Strand

Social Security Administration
Office of Retirement and Disability Policy
500 E. St., NW
Washington, DC 20254

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org

NBER Working Papers and Publications

January 2016The Effect of Disability Insurance Payments on Beneficiaries’ Earnings
with Alexander Gelber, Timothy Moore: w21851
A crucial issue in studying social insurance programs is whether they affect work decisions through income or substitution effects. We examine this in the context of U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance (DI), one of the largest social insurance programs in the U.S. The formula linking DI payments to past earnings has discontinuous changes in the marginal replacement rate that allow us to use a regression kink design to estimate the effect of payment size on earnings. Using Social Security Administration data on all new DI beneficiaries from 2001 to 2007, we document a robust income effect of DI payments on earnings. Our preferred estimate is that an increase in DI payments of one dollar causes an average decrease in beneficiaries’ earnings of twenty cents. This suggests that the incom...

Published: Alexander Gelber & Timothy J. Moore & Alexander Strand, 2017. "The Effect of Disability Insurance Payments on Beneficiaries' Earnings," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, vol 9(3), pages 229-261. citation courtesy of

January 2015Does Delay Cause Decay? The Effect of Administrative Decision Time on the Labor Force Participation and Earnings of Disability Applicants
with David H. Autor, Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J. Mullen: w20840
This paper measures the causal effect of time out of the labor force on subsequent employment of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) applicants and distinguishes it from the discouragement effect of receiving disability benefits. Using a unique Social Security Administration workload database to identify exogenous variation in decision times induced by differences in processing speed among disability examiners to whom applicants are randomly assigned, we find that longer processing times reduce the employment and earnings of SSDI applicants for multiple years following application, with the effects concentrated among applicants awarded benefits during their initial application. A one standard deviation (2.1 month) increase in initial processing time reduces long-run “substantial ga...
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us