Faculty of Economics and Management
University of Magdeburg
Postbox 4120, 39016 Magdeburg, GERMANY
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|December 2006||Online Auctions|
with Axel Ockenfels, David Reiley: w12785
The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing because of the enormous amount of freely available field data. Moreover, numerous innovations in auction-design features on platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey the theoretical, empirical, and experimental research on bidder strategies (including the timing of bids and winner's-curse effects) and seller strategies (including reserve-price policies and the use of buy-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-auction design (including stopping rules and multi-object pricing rules).