R524, Department of Economics and STICERD
LSE Research Laboratory
London School of Economics
London WC2A 2AE UNITED KINGDOM
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|September 2013||The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya|
with Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria, Gerard Padró i Miquel: w19398
Ethnic favoritism is seen as antithetical to development. This paper provides credible quantification of the extent of ethnic favoritism using data on road building in Kenyan districts across the 1963-2011 period. Guided by a model it then examines whether the transition in and out of democracy under the same president constrains or exacerbates ethnic favoritism. Across the 1963 to 2011 period, we find strong evidence of ethnic favoritism: districts that share the ethnicity of the president receive twice as much expenditure on roads and have four times the length of paved roads built. This favoritism disappears during periods of democracy.
Published: Robin Burgess & Remi Jedwab & Edward Miguel & Ameet Morjaria & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2015. "The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(6), pages 1817-51, June. citation courtesy of
|September 2011||The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics|
with Matthew Hansen, Benjamin A. Olken, Peter Potapov, Stefanie Sieber: w17417
Tropical deforestation accounts for almost one-fifth of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide and threatens the world's most diverse ecosystems. The prevalence of illegal forest extraction in the tropics suggests that understanding the incentives of local bureaucrats and politicians who enforce forest policy may be critical to understanding tropical deforestation. We find support for this thesis using a novel satellite-based dataset that tracks annual changes in forest cover across eight years of institutional change in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Increases in the numbers of political jurisdictions are associated with increased deforestation and with lower prices in local wood markets, consistent with a model of Cournot competition between jurisdictions. Illegal logging increases dramatically in...
Published: Robin Burgess & Matthew Hansen & Benjamin A. Olken & Peter Potapov & Stefanie Sieber, 2012. "The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1707-1754. citation courtesy of
|February 2006||The Unequal Effects of Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling the License Raj in India|
with Philippe Aghion, Stephen Redding, Fabrizio Zilibotti: w12031
We study the effects of the progressive elimination of the system of industrial regulations on entry and production, known as the "license raj," on registered manufacturing output, employment, entry and investment across Indian states with different labor market regulations. The effects are found to be unequal depending on the institutional environment in which industries are embedded. In particular, following delicensing, industries located in states with pro-employer labor market institutions grew more quickly than those in pro-worker environments.
Published: Aghion P, Burgess R, Redding S and Zilibotti F. "The Unequal Effects of Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling the License Raj in India." American Economic Review 94, 4 (2008): 1397-1412. citation courtesy of