Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|February 2012||Who Lives in the C-Suite? Organizational Structure and the Division of Labor in Top Management|
with Hongyi Li, Julie Wulf: w17846
This paper shows that top management structures in large US firms radically changed since the mid-1980s. While the number of managers reporting directly to the CEO doubled, the growth was driven primarily by functional managers rather than general managers. Using panel data on senior management positions, we explore the relationship between changes in executive team composition, firm diversification, and IT investments--which arguably alter returns to exploiting synergies through corporate-wide coordination by functional managers in headquarters. We find that the number of functional managers closer to the product ("product" functions i.e., marketing, R&D) increase as firms focus their businesses, while the number of functional managers farther from the product ("administrative" functions ...
Published: Prev Volume 60 Issue 4, April 2014, pp. 824-844 Next Who Lives in the C-Suite? Organizational Structure and the Division of Labor in Top Management Maria Guadalupe INSEAD, 77300 Fontainebleau, France; and Centre for Economic Policy Research, London EC1V 3PZ, United Kingdom firstname.lastname@example.org, Hongyi Li Australian School of Business, University of New South Wales, Sydney NSW 2052, Australia email@example.com, Julie Wulf Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts 02163; and National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 firstname.lastname@example.org
|December 2010||Innovation and Foreign Ownership|
with Olga Kuzmina, Catherine Thomas: w16573
This paper uses a rich panel dataset of Spanish manufacturing firms (1990-2006) and a propensity score reweighting estimator to show that multinational firms acquire the most productive domestic firms, which, on acquisition, conduct more product and process innovation (simultaneously adopting new machines and organizational practices) and adopt foreign technologies, leading to higher productivity. We propose a model of endogenous selection and innovation in heterogeneous firms that jointly explains the observed selection process and the innovation decisions. Further, we show in the data that innovation on acquisition is associated with the increased market scale provided by the parent firm.
Published: Maria Guadalupe & Olga Kuzmina & Catherine Thomas, 2012. "Innovation and Foreign Ownership," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3594-3627, December. citation courtesy of
|The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value|
with Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Gine: w16574
This paper estimates the effect of corporate governance provisions on shareholder value and long-term outcomes in S&P1500 firms. We apply a regression discontinuity design to shareholder votes on governance proposals in annual meetings. A close-call vote around the majority threshold is akin to a random outcome, allowing us to deal with prior expectations and the endogeneity of internal governance rules. Passing a corporate governance provision generates a 1.3% abnormal return on the day of the vote with an implied market value per provision of 2.8%. We also find evidence of changes in investment behavior and long-term performance improvements.
Published: Vicente CuÃ±at & Mireia Gine & Maria Guadalupe, 2012. "The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(5), pages 1943-1977, October. citation courtesy of
|November 2008||The Flattening Firm and Product Market Competition: The Effect of Trade Liberalization|
with Julie Wulf: w14491
This paper establishes a causal effect of competition from trade liberalization on various characteristics of organizational design. We exploit a unique panel dataset on firm hierarchies (1986-1999) of large U.S. firms and find that increasing competition leads firms to become flatter, i.e., (i) reduce the number of positions between the CEO and division managers (DM), (ii) increase the number of positions reporting directly to the CEO (span of control), (iii) increase DM total and performance-based pay. The results are generally consistent with the explanation that firms redesign their organizations through a set of complementary choices in response to changes in their environment.
Published: Guadalupe, Maria, and Julie Wulf. 2010. "The Flattening Firm and Product Market Competition: The Effect of Trade Liberalization on Corporate Hierarchies." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(4): 105-27. DOI: 10.1257/app.2.4.105