NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Henrik Kleven

Department of Economics
Princeton University
238 Julis Romo Rabinowitz Building
Princeton, NJ 08544
Tel: 609/986-6890

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NBER Program Affiliations: PE
NBER Affiliation: Research Associate

NBER Working Papers and Publications

September 2017The Effect of House Prices on Household Borrowing: A New Approach
with James Cloyne, Kilian Huber, Ethan Ilzetzki: w23861
July 2017Do People Respond to the Mortage Interest Deduction? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Denmark
with Jonathan Gruber, Amalie Jensen: w23600
March 2013Migration and Wage Effects of Taxing Top Earners: Evidence from the Foreigners' Tax Scheme in Denmark
with Camille Landais, Emmanuel Saez, Esben Anton Schultz: w18885

Published: Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Camille Landais & Esben Schultz, 2013. "Migration and Wage Effects of Taxing Top Earners: Evidence from the Foreigners' Tax Scheme in Denmark," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 129(1), pages 333-378. citation courtesy of

November 2010Taxation and International Migration of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market
with Camille Landais, Emmanuel Saez: w16545

Published: Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Camille Landais & Emmanuel Saez, 2013. "Taxation and International Migration of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 1892-1924, August. citation courtesy of

February 2010Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Randomized Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark
with Martin B. Knudsen, Claus T. Kreiner, Søren Pedersen, Emmanuel Saez: w15769

Published: Kleven, Henrik, Martin Knudsen, Claus Kreiner, So ren Pedersen , and Emmanuel Saez “ U nwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark ” , Econometrica 79(3), 2011, 651 - 692.

August 2009Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries
with Claus Thustrup Kreiner, Emmanuel Saez: w15218

Published: Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2016. "Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries," Economica, vol 83(330), pages 219-246. citation courtesy of

September 2008Transfer Program Complexity and the Take Up of Social Benefits
with Wojciech Kopczuk: w14301

Published: Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Wojciech Kopczuk, 2011. "Transfer Program Complexity and the Take-Up of Social Benefits," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 54-90, February. citation courtesy of

November 2006The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples
with Claus Thustrup Kreiner, Emmanuel Saez: w12685

Published: Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2009. "The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 537-560, 03. citation courtesy of

 
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