Competition and the Industrial Organization of Securities Markets

Call for Papers

December 1, 2017
Organizers: Tarun Chordia, Gideon Saar and Mao Ye

The combination of regulatory initiatives and technological innovations over the past 20 years has materially affected the industrial organization of securities markets. For example, equity trading in the U.S. used to be dominated by NYSE and NASDAQ, while currently dozens of trading venues vie for order flow and no single platform has a consistent market share of more than 25%. Similarly, the aftermath of the financial crisis brought about scrutiny of over-the-counter markets and discussions on whether regulation could affect the stability of securities markets by fostering changes in their industrial organization.

To promote research on the evolving industrial organization of securities markets, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), with the support of the Journal of Financial Markets, will convene a conference in Cambridge on December 1, 2017. Specific questions of interest include, but are not limited to:

  • How do features of trading venues impact intermarket competition?
  • Does regulation of trading fees affect the industrial organization of securities markets?
  • Do attributes of securities determine which market structures is best for investors?
  • What determines the extent of competition in over-the-counter markets?
  • What are the consequences of regulators imposing or approving design features of trading venues (e.g., minimum price increment, speed of access)?
  • How does trader competition interact with market competition?
  • How does market fragmentation impact market quality?
  • How does technological change affect market competition?
  • Does competition among markets impact the risk of the traded securities and the cost of capital of firms?
  • Who benefits from a less concentrated market?
  • What is the relation between transparency, the price discovery process, and the organization of markets?
  • What is the link between market fragility and competition between trading venues?

The conference will include invited paper presentations, comments from formal discussants, and a panel dedicated to current regulatory aspects of competition in securities markets. The conference welcomes both empirical and theoretical research. To be considered for inclusion on the program, papers must be uploaded by August 31, 2017, to the following website:

Authors who would like to have their papers considered for publication in the Journal of Financial Markets should email, Tarun Chordia , and indicate this interest when they submit their paper for the conference. The co-editors of the Journal may then choose a subset of these papers for an expedited review process (whose journal submission fees will be waived). If there is a sufficient number of papers selected by the editors, the Journal will publish a special issue on Competition and the Industrial Organization of Securities Markets.

Authors of papers on the program will be notified in early October 2017. The NBER will cover the travel cost for two authors per paper, invited discussants, and panel participants.

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