NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Working Papers by Shulamit Kahn

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Working Papers

November 2006Does Science Promote Women? Evidence from Academia 1973-2001
with Donna K. Ginther: w12691
Many studies have shown that women are under-represented in tenured ranks in the sciences. We evaluate whether gender differences in the likelihood of obtaining a tenure track job, promotion to tenure, and promotion to full professor explain these facts using the 1973-2001 Survey of Doctorate Recipients. We find that women are less likely to take tenure track positions in science, but the gender gap is entirely explained by fertility decisions. We find that in science overall, there is no gender difference in promotion to tenure or full professor after controlling for demographic, family, employer and productivity covariates and that in many cases, there is no gender difference in promotion to tenure or full professor even without controlling for covariates. However, family characteris...
November 1991Does Employer Monopsony Power Increase Occupational Accidents? The Case of Kentucky Coal Mines
w3897
A popular argument for safety regulations is that workers accept dangerous jobs because they have "no choice," or, in other words, because they have few or no alternative employment opportunities. This argument is considered in a game-theoretic framework. Because simultaneous-entry models do not yield pure-strategy equilibria, this paper develops a sequential-entry model to analyze the effect of additional firms on occupational safety. Within the context of the particular functional specification modeled, additional firms (except for the second entrant) lower average accident rates and thus increase occupational safety, consistent with the popular argument. However, with other functional specifications, the model could yield different results. As a result, the paper continues with an empir...
July 1988The Effects of Hours Constraints on Labor Supply Estimates
with Kevin Lang: w2647
Almost all labor supply models are estimated under the assumption that workers are free to choose their hours. However, theory, casual empiricism and survey data suggest that many workers are not free to vary the hours within a job. Consequently, labor supply estimates based on actual hours of work may be biased. Using Canadian data on desired hours of work, we find that using actual hours causes labor supply estimates to be biased upwards but the bias is small.
May 1987Constraints on the Choice of Work Hours: Agency vs. Specific-Capital
with Kevin Lang: w2238
Most models of implicit lifetime contracts imply that at any particular point in time, workers' wages and value of marginal product (VMP) will diverge. As a result, the contract will have to specify hours as well as wages, since firms will desire to prevent workers from working more when the wage is greater than VMP and from working less when the wage is less than VMP. this divergence, combined with the fact that in efficient contracts, the hours are set so that VMP equals the marginal value of leisure, implies that workers will face binding hours constraints. We show that the two major models of lifetime contracts, the agency model and the firm-specific capital model, make opposite predictions regarding the relation between work hours constraints and job tenure. We test these predictions....

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