NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Working Papers by Semyon Malamud

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Working Papers

August 2011Information Percolation in Segmented Markets
with Darrell Duffie, Gustavo Manso: w17295
We calculate equilibria of dynamic double-auction markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors are segmented into groups that differ with respect to characteristics determining information quality, including initial information precision as well as market “connectivity,” the expected frequency of their trading opportunities. Investors with superior information sources attain strictly higher expected profits, provided their counterparties are unable to observe the quality of those sources. If, however, the quality of bidders’ information sources are commonly observable, then, under conditions, investors with superior information sources have strictly lower expected profits.

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